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Daniel Perritt 
 
From the Taos Battle for Blue Lake to Self-Determination 
 
From the beginnings of the country, citizens of the United States 
have had many different views of Native Americans. At first it 
was a popular belief that assimilation or the practice of 
indoctrinating, that is, actively forcing Native Americans to 
partake in American society, was the best policy. In the early 
twentieth century, views shifted to one that supported a 
termination policy in which the United States sought to actively 
terminate any standing recognition of not only the rights of 
natives, but also to limit the parameters of the federal 
government’s dealings with the native tribes. During the 1970s the 
focus officially shifted from that of termination to self-
determination under the presidency of Richard Nixon. Prior to 
Nixon’s presidency there was a legal battle already taking place 
that set the stage for this policy change.  The Taos Pueblo of New 
Mexico had been in dispute with the United States government for 
the return of the Taos Blue Lake watershed. Without the Taos 
case, the North American Indian tribes located within the United 
States would most likely not have rallied behind President 
Nixon’s policy change. This paper is organized around four main 
sections, starting with the historical background of the lands. Part 
two explains the religious significance that the land held to the 
Taos. Part three traces the legal battle for the Taos Blue Lake. The 
last section focuses on the Indian Self Determination Bills:  Senate 
Bill (S.) 3157 and S. 1573. 
 
Historical Background 
 
 The Taos Pueblo have been located in the present state of 
New Mexico since at least the fourteenth century, where they 
occupied an estimated 300,000 acres of land prior to the Spanish 
colonization.1 Over time, as Spanish colonization claimed more 
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territory, the Taos lost a significant portion of the land they had 
inhabited for centuries. By 1900 it is estimated that only about 
67,000 acres, including Pueblo itself and the Blue Lake watershed, 
were under Taos control/ownership.2 This rapid recession in 
territory was not a new phenomenon for Native Americans in 
North American regions. As the expansion of the United States 
continued to encroach on Native lands, in 1906 President 
Theodore Roosevelt dealt a very heavy blow to the Taos. He 
ordered the seizure of some 50,000 acres of land, including the 
town of Taos, and the watershed itself. This was to be done 
without giving any compensation to the Taos Pueblo Indians. 
Thereafter the Blue Lake lands became part of the Carson 
National Forest, under the "care" and "jurisdiction" of the National 
Forest Service.34 The Taos were to act as caretakers of the land, 
ensuring that it would not be desecrated or despoiled. However, 
the Taos were already acting as the caretakers, and allowing an 
outside entity to have jurisdiction over lands they were already 
tending was seen by the Taos as paternalistic. Another issue with 
the Forest Service taking over jurisdiction pertains to the 
commercial logging practices that took place in the decades to 
come.5 After the seizure of the lands, the Taos leaders began a 
political battle that would last for sixty-five years. In 1926 the Taos 
agreed to not make a claim to the property in the Town of Taos, 
which was appraised at a value then of more than 300,000 dollars; 
instead, the Taos wanted 50,000 acres returned to them.6 The U.S. 
agreed to this. However, the federal government never fulfilled 
their promise to return the lands. In place of ownership, the Taos 
were "permitted" the "free use" of the lands. Then in 1928 the 
Forest Service constructed facilities on the land, which included a 
corral, outhouse, and cabin.7 
 There are many problems with not only the seizure of the 
lands, but also the rhetoric used, or "permissions" given by the 
United States government to the Taos. The first issue is with how 
the land was seized, though no compensation was given.8 Another 
problem had to do with the livelihood of the Taos who lived off 
the land and still resided in the region. The second issue was the 
“permit” and how it provided the Taos access to the land, though 
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the Forest Service only allowed such for certain religious activities 
that were deemed acceptable.9 This left the Taos vulnerable to 
having their religious practices and way of life controlled by the 
Forest Service and United States government.  
 After the creation of the Carson National Park, there was 
an increase in outside traffic by non-Indians into the area. With 
increased traffic there came a desire by the Forest Service for the 
building of new facilities. This was at least the justification given 
by the Forest Service for the creation of the cabin and outhouse. 
These acts were seemingly benign in their intent because the cabin 
and the outhouse were built in order to provide shelter to the 
rangers.  However, the outhouse was located on the edge of the 
Blue Lake, the most sacred area of the region for the Taos.10 This 
could be interpreted by the Taos as open hostility, which mirrored 
the United States policy at the time. Non-Indian persons on the 
Blue Lake lands also reminded the tribe of negative treatment 
when dealing with Franciscan missionaries seeking to suppress 
their rituals. The effects of Franciscan intrusion would cause the 
Taos to be incredibly secretive, as the rituals were thought to lose 
power with outside interference or witnesses. With the Forest 
Service and the visiting of United States citizens to the "National 
Forest," the intrusion occurring was considered an egregious 
affront to their beliefs.11 The Taos did appeal to the Forest Service, 
asking for a requirement of a permit that non-Indian persons 
would have to receive prior to visiting the land, which would 
have to be agreed to and approved by a Taos representative. 
However, the Forest Service sought to keep the lands 
“recreational” in use, not adhering to the wishes of the tribe.12 
Another important issue connected with the ownership of 
the land was the exploitation of its resources. Whether for fishing, 
hunting, or lumbering, without ownership or direct control of the 
land itself, the Taos were left at the whims of a bureaucratic entity 
that represented the interests of the United States government. 
Knowing about the interplay between the Forest Service and the 
Taos before the 1970s is important in order to understand one part 
of the discussion that would take place later on, during 
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Congressional hearings. The other important part of the debate 
concerns the significance of the lands to the Taos. 
 
 
Religious Significance 
 
 Understanding and establishing the religious significance 
of the Blue Lake watershed is essential within the context of the 
transition from termination to self-determination, especially in 
this case. As will be discussed in the next section, the spiritual 
significance of the land became the main reason for the United 
States to consider Blue Lake's return. In order to appreciate the 
religious significance of the land, it is important to detail how and 
for what purposes the Blue Lake was used by the Taos. Although, 
as previously stated, the Taos are secretive about their rituals and 
the meanings behind them, that does not mean there were no 
accounts of the rituals available to United States decision makers. 
There were a few books published detailing the elusive and 
secretive rituals at Blue Lake. Three specific examples are given by 
anthropologist John Bodine.  They include Blanche Grant's Taos 
Indians in 1925, John Collier's On the Gleaming Way in 1926, and 
Elsie Parson's Taos Pueblo in 1936. The problem with these 
accounts, according to Bodine, is that they are varied in the details 
described, which denotes that the secretive ways of the Taos 
proved difficult to bypass. However, there is one account that 
would stand the test of authenticity to Bodine, being discovered in 
1965. Ironically, the ritual described in that most reliable account 
actually occurred in 1906, when the watershed and Taos lands 
were seized.  Matilda Cox Stevenson, an ethnologist hired by the 
Bureau of Ethnology to record Indians, presented the most 
reliable account available.13 Stevenson's account detailed what 
others could not, arguably because the principal informant, who 
was a Taos, helped Stevenson to interpret the rituals, assisting her 
in providing clear understanding in her account. Where other 
accounts did not even see the ritual at Blue Lake, Stevenson did.14 
 The Taos Blue Lake ritual is performed by ten different 
societies known as Kivas within the region. Stevenson's account 
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detailed the Feather Kiva. There is a period of preliminary 
“training” that each society gives its initiates, which ranges from 
six to eighteen months, during which initiates may have no 
outside contact with their family, friends, or village until the ritual 
at Blue Lake.  Ages of the initiates vary between eight and ten.15 
At the end of their initial training, the initiates begin their 
pilgrimage to Blue Lake. Blue Lake's significance in the ritual is 
described to be the place “into which the dead descend into the 
nether worlds,” acting as a spiritual gateway for the Taos.16 Prior 
to the pilgrimage initiates must purify their bodies, first by 
drinking water from a creek. It should be noted that all of the 
waterways are interconnected within the watershed, thus making 
all of the water flowing down from Blue Lake sacred in 
accordance with Taos views. 
 After camping, singing, and dancing for the night, the 
initiates are then instructed to put on finer clothing, comprised of 
vibrant colors. Boys wear traditional leggings, girls wear silk 
dresses, and both wear moccasins. There is a separation between 
the groups moving to make the pilgrimage; it seems that the 
initiates are kept separate from those that have already 
transcended into the tribe formally. Their journey eventually leads 
them to a spring where the women grind cornmeal to be carried to 
the lake, making an offering to the gods. Both women from the 
initiation party and the main party will make offerings, though 
the main party women will offer more, seeming to denote their 
status as members of the kiva. During this time the men also pray 
to the “women grinders” to ask the gods for a good hunt, which in 
turn will affect their offerings at the lake.17 
 Upon reaching the Lake itself, the whole kiva group bathes 
in the lake, with men wearing only breeches and women wearing 
a white camisa (gown). Every person drinks from the lake using 
his or her hands. The whole beginning ritual can be seen as an 
entirely spiritual affair, where affirmation of oneness with the 
land happens with those already initiated and the spiritual purity 
of new initiates to be tested.18 There are also portions of the ritual 
that have to do with hair tying, with the females fixing the hair of 
the males, which symbolizes communal caretaking. Another ritual 
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takes place where flowers are distributed to the men from the 
female initiates, ending with ritual dancing, song, prayers, and a 
sunrise vigil.19 
 Upon returning to the village, a ritualistic feast takes place, 
where the newly initiated males are kept separate, being required 
to eat native food. Everyone who made the pilgrimage has to 
travel to another location, approximately two miles up into a 
canyon, where they perform a ritual sacrifice by plucking out all 
of their facial hair, digging a hole, placing a traditional native 
meal in the hole, covering it with the hair, and then covering the 
hole with a stone and prayer. The kiva then feasts on native food, 
and more specifically they must have deer meat. The concluding 
rituals take place over the next couple of days at the leader of the 
Feather People's house, where he gives them medicine, they eat 
more native food, and, finally, feast individually at each initiate’s 
house.2021 
 Stevenson's account of the Taos rituals gave very clear 
insight into why the land itself is so significant to the rituals. 
Beginning with the “purification” rituals, drinking from both the 
land and the lake, it is evident why the Forest Service as well as 
increased traffic from outsiders could disrupt the rituals by soiling 
the lake and the water throughout the whole watershed. The same 
could be said for the “native food” mentioned in Stevenson’s 
account; food comes from the land itself.  The food, the land, and 
the lake had all been essential for generations upon generations. 
The account also gave credence to the grievance that the Taos had 
with buildings being built upon the land, especially near the lake 
itself. When they have to not only drink, but also conduct their 
spiritual rituals in view of an outhouse and cabin built by 
outsiders, it compromised the secrecy as well as tainted the ritual 
by potentially making the scene impure.  No longer was the 
location just that of the Taos; their sacred ground was not wholly 
theirs. Similarly, with the requirement of deer meat, if the land 
was owned or managed by the Forest Service, then it would be 
subjected to the game and fishing laws of the federal government, 
which further disrupted the Taos ways. Overall it can be 
reasonably asserted that the land itself held deep symbolism for 
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the Taos: it was them and they were it. Desecrating Taos land by 
allowing others onto it is akin to having someone vandalize a 
church to a Christian.22 
 John Bodine was the one who brought this account to 
relevancy by seeking to verify its authenticity, which he did on 
three separate occasions. The first was in 1965 after he discovered 
Stevenson's account, then again in 1975 and 1981. He did this by 
seeking out members of the Feather Kiva, who largely agreed with 
the authenticity of Stevenson’s narrative. Some details were 
possibly embellished, but that doesn't detract from the overall 
proof of spiritual significance to the Taos. It was this significance 
that provided Congress with the justification to return the lands to 
the Taos. 
 
Legal Battle 
 
 Ever since their lands were seized, the Taos had sought its 
return.  For sixty-five years they attempted to safeguard their way 
of life by appealing to the United States federal government. 
Although the Taos used the method of legal appeals, the true 
pathway lay in rallying public support, which would root itself 
after the publication of Frank Water's The Man Who Killed The Deer 
in 1942. However, it was not until the 1950s and 1960s that the 
book picked up momentum, spreading knowledge of the Taos in a 
favorable light. Water's book, according to Gordon-McCutchan, 
“made people aware that the whole natural landscape, the entire 
fifty thousand acres, contained innumerable shrines where the 
Indians would go to pray and hold ceremonies.”23 By establishing 
that the land was religiously significant to the Taos, this 
eventually led to wider support, which would come to manifest 
itself in different newspaper and journal accounts across the 
country.24 
 A major victory for the Taos came from the Indian Claims 
Commission (ICC) in 1965. At that time, after reviewing the Taos 
claim to Blue Lake, the ICC found that the Taos had rights to some 
130,000 acres of land and that the land had been seized without 
compensation.25 The committee reported that, because of the 
LEGACY 
 
64 
religiously significant rituals that are a part of the Taos spiritual 
base, the Taos had a legitimate claim by way of religious 
freedom.26 Since the land was essential to the Taos, it would be 
considered unjust to seize them, especially without compensation. 
Unfortunately the ICC was limited to giving only monetary 
compensation, and only an act of Congress could actually return 
the lands to the Taos. The Taos, however, had never sought 
monetary recompense; their only goal was the return of the 
lands.27 
 ICC’s finding, coupled with growing public support, 
brought the political support needed to bring the issue to 
Congress for resolution. By 1968 the House of Representatives had 
passed the Blue Lake Bill unanimously with the support of New 
York Senator Robert F. Kennedy, Florida Congressman James 
Haley, and Interior Secretary Stewart Udall. Despite getting the 
initial bill passed by the House of Representatives, the Senate was 
an entirely different matter. Clinton Anderson from New Mexico 
was the largest opponent and was also a powerful member of the 
Senate. His stance was against the return and any sort of 
legislation that would take away the lands from the Forest 
Service.28 
 Anderson's blockage of the Blue Lake bill caused the tribe 
to launch a national campaign pushing for the ability to exercise 
its religious freedom. They were supported, most notably, by the 
National Council of Churches (NCC), an organization comprised 
of thirty-two different Christian denominations.29 Its advocacy in 
support of the Taos consisted of, according to Gordon-
McCutchan, “duplicating, mailing, public relations, provision of 
access to religious and general press outlets, contacts with people 
in Washington, receiving of mail and calls in New York, and in 
fund raising.”30 With this powerful organization acting as a sort of 
loudspeaker, they were able to reach out to its considerable base 
of member organizations. Those organizations would reach 
individual members of their congregations and, in turn, they 
would pass the word even farther. The methodology used in 
spreading knowledge regarding the Taos struggle was powerful 
mainly because of how it could force political change. Politicians 
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were bound by their constituents, and when the constituents 
supported an issue upon which the majority of Americans agreed, 
that of religious freedom, it not only benefited the Taos but also 
benefited the politicians who got involved. 
 There was one member of the NCC who acted as a voice 
for the Taos, Rev. Dean M. Kelley who was the director of the 
Commission on Religious Liberties.31  He assisted in interpreting 
for the public and for Congress, the meaning of the Blue Lake to 
the Taos. After he went to the Taos and explained how he wanted 
to help them, he wrote an article for the Journal of Church and State, 
which summarized the Taos perspective: 
 
The members of the tribe feel an ancient identity, 
not only with Blue Lake—the headwaters of their 
life-sustaining stream—but with the entire 
watershed, its plants and animals. Anything which 
mutilates the valley hurts the tribe. If the trees are 
cut, the tribe bleeds. If the springs or lakes or 
streams are polluted, the life stream of the tribe is 
infected. The mining of ore would inflict wounds 
upon the land and upon the people who revere 
it. ... The spiritual kinship which the tribe feels for 
the sources of their life and livelihood clearly 
cannot be localized in any one spot or a few, but 
extends to the whole region. The aura of sanctity, 
which has its source in the water-courses where the 
Creators' life-sustaining water flows out to the 
inhabitants of semi-arid land, is indivisible from 
the related lands and the living things they 
produce.32 
 
During the period in which momentum was building between the 
Taos and the American people, they garnered more political 
support in Congress against Senator Anderson. Even the 
Governor of New Mexico, David Cargo, threw his support behind 
the Taos.33 There were multiple hearings on the Blue Lake bill, 
though the most substantial of them came after the support of 
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President Richard Nixon on July 8, 1970. He wrote a letter to 
Congress explicitly stating his support for the Native Americans, 
identifying the historical wrongs that had been done to them first 
by European settlers and then by the United States government. 
With his letter Nixon addressed his personal change from 
supporting the termination policy to supporting self-
determination for the Indians. His reasoning for the change was 
that it was “morally wrong” to continue the old policy because the 
promises made by the federal government had never been 
actualized in favor of Indians; he argued that the agreements the 
government and tribes entered into were always one-sided--never 
mutual nor completed on the part of the United States. 
Termination, according to Nixon, removed even that small 
safeguard of wardship the Indians had in relation to the federal 
government. He went on to detail how termination as a policy 
often made Indians more reliant on the federal government by 
taking away their ability to survive autonomously. Another point 
Nixon made was that, along with that policy, the people in charge 
of the reservations or tribal affairs were often not even the tribes 
themselves, but bureaucratic agencies. He did not specifically 
name the agency, but it seemed to be the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
and the Forest Service to which he referred. Nixon also gave nine 
specific areas he wanted to address during his term: rejecting 
termination, the right to control and operate federal programs, 
restoring the sacred lands near Blue Lake, Indian education, 
economic development of legislation, more money for Indian 
health, helping urban Indians, an Indian Trust Counsel Authority, 
and an Assistant Secretary for Indian and Territorial Affairs. It 
was in his letter that Nixon specifically stated his support not only 
for the Taos, but also for H.R. 471, the bill that would return Blue 
Lake (which, at that time, was being held up in the Senate by 
Anderson).34 
 Nixon's support for the Taos stemmed not only from the 
pressure of public support during the campaign by the Taos and 
the NCC, but also from his personal experience. During his time at 
Whittier College, Nixon had an Indian football coach by the name 
of “Chief Wallace Newman” whom he respected. This admiration 
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would foster a positive image of Indians for Nixon, making this a 
matter that was both political and personal for him.35 
 In the Senate hearings after Nixon's support became 
known, specifically for H.R. 471, there followed a sort of last stand 
by Senator Anderson, who defended his position against the 
return of the land. Within the Senate committee hearings on the 
matter there was a discussion between Secretary of Interior Walter 
Hickel and Senator Anderson pertaining to the differences 
between H.R. 471 and Anderson's S. 750 counterproposal. The 
differences between the two were blatant, with Hickel supporting 
the Taos under the religious grounds that had been established, 
documented, and affirmed, whereas Anderson argued that the 
United States was justified in its claim to the land on the basis of 
the Spanish Guadalupe Hidalgo Treaty of 1848. Anderson stated 
that his position derived from the idea that the Taos had been 
largely unhindered even after the land was taken by the United 
States.36 To further his point, he asked Hickel whether the land 
was indeed “stolen” and “by whom.” Throughout the discussion 
Anderson's disposition might have been described as crude in that 
he clearly did not want the return to happen. He also stated in a 
letter to the committee that there were multiple attempts to 
reconcile or pay monetary damages to the Taos for the land itself, 
even though, technically, the tribe did not have “aboriginal title” 
claims due to the 1848 treaty. To Anderson, it was unjust for the 
United States to compensate the Taos while, at the same time, 
turning over the land. Anderson was also concerned about setting 
a precedent of land return to Indian tribes throughout the United 
States, citing approximately 1,373,810,150 acres of land being 
claimed through the ICC.37 His concern lay in both the broader 
context and for the state of New Mexico. It can be asserted that his 
bias toward the Forest Service derived from the possibility of 
exploiting the land for profit through the lumber industry. Any 
intrusion upon the jurisdiction of the Forest Service undermined 
the authority of the government on land that was rightfully the 
property of United States. 
 He was countered, not only by Secretary Hickel but also by 
many representatives of the Taos, including Paul Bernal, Querino 
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Romero, William Schaab, and David Cargo. These individuals 
were important for their respective places in the Taos community.  
Paul Bernal was the leading spiritual guide, Querino Romero was 
the Governor of the Taos, William Schaab was their leading 
special counsel, and David Cargo was the Governor of New 
Mexico.  All of them stateed their support for H.R. 471, and 
reaffirmed their positions of spiritual justification for the return of 
the Blue Lake to Indian trust and title.38 Though it was Secretary 
Hickel who aptly defended the Taos perspective best; as he stated 
in contradiction to Anderson's view, the lands were not 
compensated for, and the Taos had been denied compensation 
since the battle began. It was not about monetary value, which set 
it apart from the other claims in the ICC, Hickel argued; he 
concluded that “it is a very difficult thing to try to settle a 
religious thing with money.”39  Another major participant in the 
debate was Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona, who was 
considered an expert on Indian Affairs. He weighed in against 
Anderson's point of view, throwing his support to the Taos. 
 Anderson's point of view is linear in concept, drawing on 
the previous notion that the only way for the United States to 
right the wrong was by payment, not by land return. Yet the only 
form of repayment available in the eyes of the Taos was the land 
return. Senator Anderson's S. 750 would put the land back under 
the control of the Forest Service, and even then, as detailed by the 
“Taos Indian Delegation,” it would essentially split up the land in 
a combination of Forest Service areas and Taos run lands, which 
was counter to keeping the entire watershed sufficiently intact for 
religious purposes.40 The significance behind the Taos Pueblo case 
in comparison to the other cases in the ICC was due to the cultural 
aspects that separated it from other claims. 
 Ultimately, amidst strong public, political, and presidential 
support, Senator Anderson lost his battle for S. 750 on December 
2, 1970 with a six-to-one vote, and on December 15, 1970, less than 
two years after the campaign gained attention and less than six 
months after Nixon's support, H.R. 471 was signed into law. It 
returned the Blue Lake lands, totaling 48,000 acres, to the Taos 
Pueblo Indians of New Mexico in order to protect their religious 
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rights and way of life. During the signing ceremony President 
Nixon expressed his gratitude to the bi-partisan effort that made 
the bill happen, as well as restating his desire for a change in 
United States policy toward Native Americans. The ceremony 
concluded with Romero, the spiritual leader of the Taos giving 
thanks to President Nixon for the return of the lands and offering 
a prayer. 
 
Indian Self-determination 
 
 What followed the 1970 signing was the drafting of 
legislation for general Indian self-determination. There were two 
different bills that were introduced during the process, S. 1573 and 
S. 3157. The goal of the Nixon administration was to give Indians 
as much power over federal programs as possible, allowing them 
to set up what they saw fit, though allowing them the ability to let 
the federal government maintain programs should the Indians 
want them. This was supposed to allow for autonomy of sorts 
from the United States government, providing them with the 
safety of support while still being able to manage or control tribal 
destiny. 
 Similar to the Blue Lake's H.R. 471 and S. 750, there were 
two fundamental differences between S. 1573 and S. 3157. The 
latter bill contained paternalistic language that conflicted with 
what Nixon wanted; while it allowed for tribes to contract 
programs through the government, the government would 
ultimately have authority to take control of the programs should it 
see a “violent” or “negligent” situation happening. If it had 
passed, there would have been nothing to stop the United States 
government from exerting its authority over the tribes, with little 
explanation or description of what might constitute violent or 
negligent acts. S. 1573 provided a timeline upon which the 
Secretary of Interior had to turn over programs to Indians, once 
created. 
 There were concerns on both sides of each bill for the 
Indians. William Youpee, the President of the National Tribal 
Chairman’s Association, had reservations about S. 1573 because it 
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sounded too much like termination. He also stated his hesitancy 
toward proposed United States policy change because of how 
Indians have been treated earlier. This view was blunted by the 
signing and return of the Taos Blue Lake, which showed the 
government intent to right the wrongs that were previously 
commonplace. The bulk of legislators were in support of S. 1573 
because it was more inclusive of the Indian populace and because 
S. 3157 treated Indians as if they were no more than a contracting 
party.41 These fundamental differences in policy would create 
unified support for the passage of S. 1573, creating the authority 
for the Indians to determine their own destinies. On January 4, 
1975, the Indian Self-determination and Education Assistance Act 
was signed into law, effectively changing the way the United 
States government interacted with Indian tribes. 
 
Legacy 
 
 In the aftermath of the adoption of self-determination as 
the new policy, some Indians were hesitant to exercise their power 
for fear of termination. The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) had to 
adopt its own more forceful stance and actually push Indian 
groups to create their own programs. Once this began, and 
Indians saw the usefulness of the programs, there was a surge of 
use. This did have some lasting effects, specifically in terms of 
budgeting. With the growth in use, the funding had to be 
distributed in a more specific manner. Ultimately tribes in “critical 
need” were given priority over others. Allen C. Quetone, a 
veteran of the BIA, asserts a mixed result in the implementation of 
self-determination. He states that, in order for the programs to be 
effectively introduced to the Indian community that created them, 
there should be proper government setup within the tribe. There 
is also a seeming gap between the actual interpretation of the law 
and the personnel in the BIA who exercise either not enough or 
too much control over programs.42 
 It appears that Quetone’s stance on the subject is mostly 
positive in light of the past government policy objectives. With the 
right intentions on behalf of the BIA and the right infrastructure in 
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tribal politics, Indian self-determination can be useful. It does 
have its pitfalls. However, it is still a relatively new policy that is 
undergoing its own changes after implementation. 
 Throughout the history of the United States, no policy 
toward the Native populations of North America has been so 
starkly in contrast to the past than that of Indian self-
determination. The promotion of Indian inclusion and autonomy 
through the wanted assistance of programs that are specifically 
designed by and for Indians meets the objectives outlined by 
President Richard Nixon and have been made possible through 
the struggle of the Taos for their religious freedom. The Taos case 
allowed for the United States government to actually implement a 
change in policy, raised public awareness, and garnered the 
support needed to shift from termination to self-determination. 
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